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The Historical Roots of the 
 ‘Awkward Partner’ Narrative 
Academic, political and even popular perceptions of Britain’s four and half decades 
as an EC/EU member are dominated by what is frequently referred to as the 
‘awkward partner’ narrative.  This emphasizes the multiple clashes between the UK 
and its continental partners, the doubts about ‘Europe’ in British domestic 
discourse, and, sometimes the misgivings and annoyance about perfidious Albion 
felt amongst the other member states.  Britain has thus seen itself – and has been 
seen by others – as a reluctant European, unsure in its commitment to the cause, 
and hence prone to squabble and fight with its fellow Community/Union members. 
 A detailed look at Britain’s track record as an EC/EU member state suggests 
however that reality has been rather more complex.  The UK certainly has had its 
fair share of disagreements and rows with its European partners.  The squabbles and 
crises highlighted by the awkward partner tale are real enough.  But they have 
always been flanked by a much more constructive pattern of engagement – one 
where British governments, British officials, and British political parties have been 
able to exercise significant influence over the course of the integration process.  
Such active participation has helped promote policies that the UK favoured – 
notably the establishment of the Single Market and successive rounds of 
Community/EU enlargement -, has enabled many British officials in Brussels to gain 
strong and largely positive reputations, and has made the UK viewpoint an 
important factor in explaining what has and hasn’t happened in the 
Community/Union ever since 1973.  The UK in other words has been an active – and 
successful – partner, as well as an awkward one. 
 There are many ways of explaining why this more positive tale of British 
participation has been so systematically overshadowed by the standard awkward 
partner narrative.  Some would highlight the different political and bureaucratic 
levels at which the constructive and combative engagement has taken place; a lot of 
the positive contribution has been made at meetings that the media seldom cover 
or notice, whereas many of the rows have occurred at the highly mediatised 
European summits.  Margaret Thatcher’s strident disagreements with Jacques 
Delors or Helmut Kohl or David Cameron’s attempt to veto the Eurozone’s first 
institutional response to the Euro crisis have always loomed much larger in 
journalistic coverage of the European integration process than the constructive day-
to-day contributions of less senior ministers or officials.  Also important has been 
the UK’s decision both early on in its EEC membership and more recently to 
confront head-on certain central policy priorities desired by its partners that it was 
never likely to be able to alter.  This occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s with the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and then again in the 1990s with Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).  The highly predictable failure of such Quixotic attempts 
then all but eclipsed successful British influence over other, lower-profile, policy 
areas.  
 Still more significant, however, has been a strong tendency amongst the 
British political elite, the British press, and even the British public seemingly to 
prefer accounts which emphasised the confrontational aspects of British European 
policy and downplayed the country’s positive contributions.  This lopsided reading  
appeared very early in Britain’s European experience, and persisted until the messy 
end.  And this is where the longer-term history of relations between Britain and its 
geographical neighbours comes in.  Because in explaining why so many in the UK 
seem to have instinctively interpreted their country’s relationship with its ostensible 
partners through an adversarial viewpoint, historical tropes about the country’s 
splendid isolation, brave resistance to continental tyranny, and preference for 
empire or the US rather than its continental neighbours would appear to have 
played an important role. 
 References back to Britain’s nineteenth century history matter in this 
context largely because of their seeming implication that the country’s apogee of 
power and prestige coincided with a period of detachment (or ostensible 
detachment at least) from the rest of Europe.  Few politicians, journalists or citizens 
know much about the foreign policy of Lord Salisbury.  But a vague notion of Pax 
Britannica, plus the resonant sound of the ‘splendid isolation’ formula itself, has 
helped to sustain the idea that active engagement with its neighbours of the type 
that has characterised British policy since 1973 (if not much earlier) is a sign of how 
much the country’s prestige, position and sense of self-worth has declined from the 
heyday of Empire.  Becoming European seemed as one former Commissioner put it 
to me nearly 30 years ago an option resorted to ‘faute de mieux’. This contrasted 
strongly with the experience of many other EU member states for whom joining 
‘Europe’ was a step away from inglorious isolation, and a way of re-engaging with 
those moments of national history when Spain, Poland, Hungary, or Austria had 
been European powers to be reckoned with.  The UK’s own ‘return to Europe’, in 
other words, was a recognition of weakness, a gesture of resignation, rather than a 
welcome escape from enforced marginalization.  In such circumstances, it is hardly 
surprising that for many the reality of this enforced participation, this loveless 
marriage, has been the litany of squabbles and disappointments that make up the 
awkward partner narrative. 
 Still more resonant and ubiquitous have been references back to the era of 
World War II.    Overuse of allusions to 1939-45 is, in many ways, a feature of British 
culture more widely, perhaps reflecting a school system where the historical period 
is one of the very few that all children study, often more than once.  But even 
against this backdrop, the sheer number of rhetorical nods back to the Second 
World War in the debate about Britain and Europe is striking.  Pro-Europeans were 
not immune, Harold Macmillan, talking of the early EEC as ‘giving them [the 
Germans] on a plate what we fought two world wars to prevent’ – although in his 
case, the desire to avert either German or French dominance of the new grouping 
would ultimately become a reason for Britain to join rather than to stay outside. It 
was on the other side of the debate, though, that this rhetorical strand was most in 
evidence.  This was true at the very outset of the ‘great debate’ in British politics, 
with opponents of Macmillan’s 1961 application taking out full page advertisements 
featuring Viscount Montgomery in their efforts to block EEC membership.   He was 
not shy about using vehemently anti-German language, replete with allusions to 
both World Wars.   Similarly, glances back to World War II remained commonplace 
during the 1975 referendum campaign, albeit more prevalent in constituents 
correspondence with MPs than in official campaign documents.  An unofficial poster 
used by some Scottish young Conservatives, though, pulled no punches, featuring a 
Swastika surrounded by the wording ‘Where they failed 1939-1945 they can succeed 
by Treaty of Rome’. Comparable language recurred in the late 1980s, most famously 
perhaps with Nicholas Ridley’s claim that the EC was ‘a German racket to take over 
the whole of Europe.’ In 2016, The Sun, could dismiss the outcome of David 
Cameron’s renegotiation with the EU with the Dad’s Army inspired front-page 
headline, ‘Who do EU think you are kidding, Mr Cameron?’ And the ‘Hitler’ analogy 
was again notoriously deployed by Boris Johnson in the course of the 2016 
referendum campaign. Nor is there any sign that the outcome of the 2016 
referendum has killed the trope: it is now reported that hardline Brexiteers, 
disillusioned with the Prime Minister’s proposed concessions to the EU, have taken 
to referring to their party leader as ‘Theresa the appeaser’. 
 Alongside the repeated allusions to World War II and Britain’s ‘Finest Hour’, 
has been a less frequent, but nonetheless persistent stream of historical analogies 
with earlier moments of peril from continental threats.  These include nods to 
Britain’s role in resisting and then defeating Napoleon, in defying the Spanish 
Armada, or in fighting the French during the Hundred Years War.  The attraction of 
being able to play with the language of Shakespeare’s history plays, or, for 
cartoonists, to adapt James Gillray’s satirical images of Napoleon, only added to the 
appeal of using these longer range historical comparisons.  More often though they 
were combined with Second World War analogies.  In 1961 the Daily Express thus 
asserted ‘The nation that resisted Napoleon and Hitler is not prepared to submit to 
Professor Hallstein [the first president of the European Commission]’; over half a 
century later, Johnson’s 2016 outburst also mentioned Hitler and Napoleon in the 
same breath. 
 Such language mattered for at least two reasons.  The first was that by 
framing British involvement in the process of integration as the continuation of 
centuries of conflict and enmity with Germany, France and other continental 
powers, it helped create an expectation of discord and strife.  The awkward partner 
narrative discussed above thus seemed normal or predictable; the constructive 
engagement, an aberration, if noticed at all.  The efforts of Margaret Thatcher, John 
Major or David Cameron to resist and block various aspects of European integration, 
became Churchillian struggles against a new continental threat, isolation in Brussels 
or at European summits a proof of Britain’s rightness and moral superiority, rather 
than something to be ashamed of or needing to be explained away.  Secondly and 
more insidiously, the placement of Britain’s European experience in a continuum of 
conflict, all but drowned out the widespread continental European narrative about 
integration being a process which promoted peace and helped overcome the 
enmities that had led to European war.  This was a line that some of those involved 
in the early promotion of British EEC membership had been keen to popularise.  
One of the Keep Britain in Europe posters in 1975 for instance read, ‘Forty million 
people died in two European wars this century. Better lose a little national 
sovereignty than a son or daughter. Vote Yes to keep the peace.’ But this message 
failed to ever make much headway in Britain – hence in part the mystification of 
much of the UK press (and David Cameron’s conspicuous absence from the prize 
ceremony) when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.  The EC/EU it 
seems was easier for the British to interpret as the continuation of past struggle, 
rather than its antidote. 
 The final strand of historical allusion that proved of importance in shaping 
British attitudes towards European integration was that which repeatedly 
contrasted the natural rapport with ‘kith and kin’ in the Empire/Commonwealth 
(and sometimes too the fellow English-speaking US) with the much more artificial 
ties with Europe.  Perhaps unsurprisingly the most vocal exponent of this line in the 
early debates about Britain and Europe was Lord Beaverbrook and the Daily 
Express.  One of the paper’s columnists thus asserted in the course of the first 
application, ‘Cross the English Channel tomorrow and you will be abroad.  Cross to 
the other side of the earth… you will be at home.’ Ties with the former empire were 
reinforced furthermore, in the view of another contributor to the Express, by the 
sacrifices made by Dominion servicemen in the course of both World Wars.  ‘Oceans 
separate their homelands from each other and Britain… Yet they came, and tens 
and hundreds of thousands came with them, to fight for a country that they had 
never seen.  Just because that country was Britain.’ And yet now, the implication 
was clear, Britain was proposing to desert such countries in favour of many of those 
that the fighting had been against.  By the time Britain actually joined the 
Community, admittedly, some of this unvarnished empire sentiment had faded, 
although Commonwealth nostalgia never disappeared entirely.  But the temptation 
to look upon Europe as a source of difficulty, for the redress of which Britain needed 
to look to its more distant friends, continued to lurk not far below the surface of 
political debate.  Mrs Thatcher’s extraordinary outburst in 1999 captures it well: 'We 
are quite the best country in Europe… I dare say it – I'm told I have to be careful 
about what I say and I don't like it – in my lifetime all our problems have come 
from mainland Europe and all the solutions have come from the English-
speaking nations of the world that have kept law-abiding liberty alive for the 
future.' 
 None of these views, of course, suffice in isolation to explain either the 
outcome of the 2016 referendum or the discomforts of Britain’s experience 
within the EC/EU.  But realising how historically rooted has been the adversarial 
mode of thought that many in Britain have used to analyse the integration 
process, does help explain why UK politicians, journalists and public alike have 
been more interested in confrontation rather than cooperation in Brussels.  The 
awkward partner narrative is not a fiction, but it isn’t a wholly representative 
view either.  It does however fit well with how many in this country have chosen 
to see our European ties, whether prior to EC membership, during our forty plus 
years within the EC/EU, or, no doubt, in the troubled years that lie ahead.  
